The annual African Union (AU) summit will take place this week for the first time since 2020 without COVID-19 restrictions. It coincides with the fragile return to peace in northern Ethiopia, the resurgence of widespread instability in the Great Lakes and the ongoing war in Ukraine, which continues to raise questions about African positions.
He United Nations (UN) The paralysis of the Security Council due to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine illustrates a crisis of global multilateralism. While this observation is rarely extended to Africa, several developments suggest a similar crisis in African multilateralism.
These include the lack of post-coup management transitions and the deadlock around regional sanctions and the suspension regimesconfusion about the AU’s responsibilities vis-à-vis the regional bloc and the practical implications of subsidiarityand the difficulties faced by regional security systems in dealing with violent extremism.
The AU is the most representative international organization in Africa. Through consensus, it establishes means for states to cooperate and establish norms of accepted behavior. His ability to provide pragmatic solutions to the key items on this week’s summit agenda will demonstrate his determination to solve the crisis of multilateralism.
During the summit, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet to discuss the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) crisis forks regional transcendence. This will be the first meeting of the PSC at the level of heads of state on the issue since 2016. The main challenge will be agreeing on the role of the AU in resolving a crisis in which it has had little direct involvement.
Along with the UN, mediation is currently dominated by the Nairobi Process initiated by the East African Community and the Luanda initiative launched by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The PSC has a role in coordinating regional efforts, but several of its member states have an apparently narrow conception of subsidiarity. As a result, the AU, especially the AU Commission, gets sidelined as soon as a regional bloc gets involved.
Beyond harmonizing initiatives in the Great Lakes, can the PSC create a consensual solution given regional tensions and competition? South Africa, which is calling the PSC meeting, wants to regain a foothold in the Great Lakes since the DRC joined the East African Community. (The DRC is also part of the Southern African Development Community.) This will test the ability of the regional powers (Angola, Kenya and South Africa) to collaborate for peace and security rather than compete for influence.
Another challenge facing African multilateralism is the AU’s struggle to manage disagreements between member states. Israel’s accreditation to the AU last year, which complied with AU regulations, sparked fierce debates and divisions.
Consequently, the issue was dropped from the summit’s agenda, raising questions about how consensus can be achieved in an organization that abstains from voting. Had a vote been held, roughly two-thirds of member states would likely have approved Israel’s accreditation, showing how vocal but influential minorities can silence a less powerful majority.
Competition between states for AU seats is a growing trend. It took the eastern region nearly a year to determine who, between Kenya and eventual winner Comoros, would assume the rotating AU presidency in 2023. This year, the looming contest between Algeria and Morocco for the AU vice presidency could fracture. further organization and deliver an incomplete table of the Assembly.
AU indecision often leads to inconsistencies. This is symbolized by the participation of Chad’s transitional president, Mahamat Kaka Déby, at this week’s summit, despite his contempt for commitments made to the PSC in 2021. Disagreement between states has meant no airing no communication after the last meeting of the PSC on Chad on November 11, 2022.
The current AU Commission has reached half its term. Given that the president will not run for a third term, what are the member states’ expectations of the commission and its president two years after the near unanimous re-election of Moussa Faki Mahamat?
In 2022, it experienced two major setbacks: accreditation from Israel and Chad. He had requested the suspension of the country after the entry into force of the transitional military regime rape of commitments with the PSC.
AU commission chairs have often faced headwinds from member states. However, the current volatile international context and calls for a greater role for the AU call for a stronger, not a weaker, commission chair.
Finally, it is time to question the impact of the institutional reform of the AU that began five years ago. While all of those processes are disruptive, several reports indicate low morale among staff. So it is not surprising that many have joined the secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area in Accra, thereby further weakening the AU Commission.
The merger of the former peace/security and political affairs departments was one of the highlights of the reform. Has the AU’s ability to manage and prevent conflicts improved? The AU’s marginalization in the Great Lakes, the Sahel and Mozambique raises many questions, as does its treatment of the Cameroon conflict.
The unclear and inadequate practice of subsidiarity also affects peace support operations. Recently, troops sent by the East African Community to the east of the DRC and the Southern African Development Community to Mozambique were mandated at the regional level and only presented after the fact to the PSC. This contrasts with the handling of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the G5 sahel Joint Force.
The 36th AU summit could be an opportunity to break with institutional and bureaucratic routines and address the potential crisis of the organization 20 years after its creation. While AU reforms have mainly addressed the agency’s structures (its ‘hardware’), little has been done with its software, particularly on governance, peace and security.
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Reducing the AU Commission to a mere secretariat whose powers are regularly eroded by member states when their interests clash is a sign of an organization seeking its raison d’être. That does not bode well for African multilateralism.
Paul-Simon Handy, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Director for East Africa and AU Representative and Félicité Djilo, Independent Researcher
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